Learn from the fall of the Philippines prepare the third island chain
USNI Proceedings
CNO Naval History Essay Contest—Professional Historian First Prize, Sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute.
By Lieutenant Commander Frederick “Andy” Cichon, U.S. Navy (Retired)
December 2024
As the potential for a Chinese assault on Taiwan looms, the United States must fortify and expand its existing Indo-Pacific bases.
In the event of a war between China and the United States, the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific would rely on defending long-established bases in the first and second island chains—which include those in Guam, Japan, and South Korea—to deploy garrisoned forces and to establish new bases in the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Micronesia.
The U.S. defeat in the Philippines shortly after its entry into World War II proved this strategy can be challenging when air and missile defense is not certain. The United States had to establish new bases in the less-vulnerable third island chain.
Today, the United States must anticipate where its existing bases are vulnerable and adjust its strategy to emphasize developing new bases after a war has begun, rather than reinforcing existing bases, and preparing to rapidly establish expeditionary advanced bases in and on the periphery of contested environments.
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