Factors in Australia’s maritime interests
Australian Naval Institute
By A Naval Observer*
7 January 2024
A simplistic view of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and its emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region has seen some commentators focusing on geography when explaining Australia’s recent decision to not send a naval vessel to the Red Sea.
The decision was no doubt based on many factors, most of which are not in the public domain, so this article is not arguing for or against the decision itself. Rather, it seeks to draw out key factors relating to Australia’s national interest and a potential misreading of the DSR, particularly around Australia’s maritime security interests.
But first, some background. In recent weeks, Houthi rebels in Yemen have been firing rockets and missiles at ships in the southern Red Sea. Many of these have been shot down but some have found their mark and damaged merchant ships.
The risk is such that many shipping companies are routing ships away from the Suez Canal/Red Sea area, which will inevitably lead to increased costs. The US is leading a multi-national naval effort known as Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter this Red Sea threat.
However, Australia has declined to send warships to this operation and some resulting commentary appears underpinned by a perception that the DSR has directed Australian military activity to be confined to the Indo-Pacific region.
While such a geographically based focus makes sense in many ways given the evolving geo-strategic situation, it is not necessarily a sound basis for the deployment of naval forces in all circumstances.
The decision on where and when to deploy the ADF is rightly one for the government of the day, which must balance competing priorities at the time to best serve our national interests. All countries share two common vital national interests: territorial integrity and political independence.
However, there are other country specific interests that should also be deemed vital and worth protecting. In Australia’s case, the ability to trade by sea and the maintenance of a stable and predictable international system are two such interests. This leads to a discussion on how and where our maritime forces are best used; an issue not widely understood across our community.
As an island nation reliant upon seaborne trade, the free flow of goods to and from our shores is critical and, consequently, maritime security is essential for our economic prosperity and security. Luckily, our ability to use the oceans (ie exercise Sea Control) has been largely unhindered since World War 2. However, unlike the days of Mahan and Corbett[1], today no country independently owns the ships, cargoes, crews, and financial aspects of merchant fleets, nor the navies that protect them (with the possible exception of China if her current trajectory continues).
Commercial shipping is a globalised industry with potentially dozens of countries having interests in a single ship and her cargo.
The industry operates within a ‘system’ – one that has evolved significantly since the introduction of shipping containers and purpose-built oil and gas ships and is based largely on a hub-and-spoke distribution system.
This, in turn, has been built on the features of globalisation such as country specialisation, cost minimisation and ‘just in time’ stockpiling. While globalisation has brought tremendous improvements in global standards of living since World War 2, it has also eroded national resilience and made countries vulnerable to even minor disruptions to the international flow of goods.
Australia is now so reliant upon the importation of many goods that we have lost the ability to manufacture them ourselves – the car industry being just one example, but so too are electronics, oil, medicines and fertilizers.
For much of the post-Cold War period, the fragility inherent in the globalised system was deemed acceptable given the economic benefits – to the point that most of us now do not even see it as a risk; it’s just ‘how things are.’
As the DSR reminds us, however, strategic circumstances are rapidly changing and the easiest way to damage many countries – our own included – is to disrupt that international trading system. Australia is particularly vulnerable to this type of interference, most obvious in our poor strategic stockholdings of fuel, but that is just one example of our reliance on ‘just in time’ supply chains more widely, which is a growing vulnerability.
The grounding of the MV Ever Given in the Suez Canal in 2021 provided a graphic and widely publicised example of how fragile shipping flows are, but that was an accident that was in everyone’s interest to resolve.
The current Houthi actions in the southern Red Sea – without getting into the politics behind why they are doing it – are deliberately designed to impede the flow of merchant shipping, so we have the situation where a key vulnerability in the globalised economy is being deliberately exploited to our collective detriment.
Professor Geoffrey Till (coincidently the ANI’s 2023 Commodore Sam Bateman Book Prize winner[2]) first published his seminal work Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century in 2003 and has updated it a number of times since then.[3]
Till articulates the concept of “Post Modern” navies that he foresaw evolving after the end of the Cold War as the world became more globalised. Till’s Post Modern navies work collaboratively together to protect the international trading system, rather than work solely in their own country’s direct interest, although there is obviously a balance between the two.
Much of the post-Cold War period has seen this play out[4], with multinational naval efforts across the Middle East, off the Somali coast and in many other regions. The RAN has generally deployed in this Post Modern manner for the last three decades.
While globalisation works well when everyone benefits, as times get tight it is natural that countries will focus more on their direct national interest and become less “Post Modern” in their thinking. We are seeing this trend today; indeed, this is the genesis of the Indo-Pacific focus in the DSR. But we must be careful not to amalgamate all military activity into the one basket.
Major land deployments are a significant undertaking and it is very easy to become enmeshed in such activities and very difficult to leave, as the US (and allies) discovered in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Maritime deployments, however, are different in nature. Ships are relatively easy to deploy, do not require the same level of host nation support, and, importantly, are very easy to remove from a situation if Australian interests are no longer served.
But most importantly, they have tremendous utility in helping the collective protection of the global trading system and the free flow of merchant trade. As the RAN cannot protect global shipping independently (no nation can), there is an inherent logic in any decision to deploy maritime forces to support the global system – to play our part in the collective effort – wherever Australian interests are at risk.
And again, seaborne trade is a vital national interest for Australia.
As mentioned earlier, this article is not advocating one way or the other on the specific decision regarding Operation Prosperity Guardian – it is the responsibility of the duly elected government to weigh risks at the time of each decision and allocate resources accordingly – but to highlight that we must be careful that the intent of the DSR is not misconstrued to mean all ADF activity should be confined to our immediate region.
Certainly, the focus must shift to the Indo-Pacific, but the ADF must also be prepared to deploy and support Australia’s vital national interests whenever and wherever they are threatened.
*The author has had a long career in the Royal Australian Navy
[1] Writing in the early 20th Century, prior to World War 1
[2] Professor Till won the prize for his book ‘How to Grow a Navy’. For the prize announcement see https://navalinstitute.com.au/how-to-grow-navy-wins-2023-commodore-sam-bateman-book-prize/
[3] Till, G., 2018, ‘Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century’ (4th Edition), Routledge, London
[4] The one exception to this has been China, which is pursuing what Till terms “Modern” tendencies. Modern navies operate highly capable vessels but use them in primarily national interests, rather than working to defend the system as a whole. While China has had a regular presence in the Middle East their ships have not been integrated into the Coalition Maritime Force, or any other coalition construct.